Debate on Divine Punishment: Punishment is an evil that God permits for a greater good

I continue the debate between Alejandro Bermúdez and myself on the topic of whether God punishes or not. This is the first part of an analysis of the next two episodes of Alejandro’s programs on this subject, published on the Catholic news portal ACIPrensa and on his YouTube channel ACITV, where he responds to the arguments I have presented thus far to demonstrate that it is a theological error to claim that God does not inflict temporal punishments.

Before proceeding, I would like to make a few clarifications:

First: I regret that Alejandro’s audience still lacks direct access to my arguments. While he comments on them, he does not mention the site where they are published. It is a matter of justice to allow the audience to hear the opposing side so they can objectively assess the arguments of both parties. Since there are still several episodes left to be published, I believe there is time for him to provide that opportunity.

Second: To the readers who have expressed concern that this debate might scandalize, give the impression that Catholics are divided, or cause division, I clarify: Apologetics is the branch of theology that explains and defends the truths of the faith. It would be poor apologetics if, out of a misguided sense of human respect or excessive scrupulosity, I prioritized maintaining appearances over confronting error wherever it may be found (it is the error, not the person, that we combat). As Pope Francis has clearly stated: “Problems in the Church are resolved by confronting, discussing, and praying.”

Third: I want to thank the readers who have contributed with their insights, comments, and suggestions. Some contributions have been so valuable that I have incorporated them into this new installment. A heartfelt thanks to all of you.

Alejandro Bermúdez’s Arguments

In this section, I will not dwell on Alejandro’s peripheral arguments, where he repeatedly claims that my articles are merely an overwhelming collection of citations from the Bible, the Church Fathers, the Popes, and the Magisterium, as if I were a walking library of quotes without the capacity for reasoning or applying “theological reasoning.” For a response to that argument, you can refer to the previous chapter and judge for yourself whether I cite improperly or out of context. I will focus instead on the two main arguments Alejandro uses to assert that God does not punish.

Objection 1: God is love; therefore, God does not punish

To support his point, Alejandro refers to the Catechism of the Catholic Church, particularly sections 212 to 217, where it describes God’s nature, emphasizing His rich love, faithfulness, benevolence, kindness, and mercy. Alejandro argues that, through theological reasoning, this somehow proves that God does not punish.

If we were to summarize his argument graphically, it would look like this:

I apologize if it seems I am oversimplifying Alejandro’s argument, but the truth is that this is essentially it, and there was no need to refer to the Catechism to prove that God is merciful, as if anyone denied it.

At this point in the debate, there should be no difficulty in understanding that when we say God is love, we also affirm that because He loves, He punishes. This is precisely what Scripture says: “For whom the Lord loveth, he chastiseth; and he scourgeth every son whom he receiveth” (Hebrews 12:6). To support this, in addition to Scripture, I have been citing the Church Fathers, the Magisterium, and the Popes, who explicitly state that punishment is an act of love. Therefore, I will not repeat what I have already stated in previous installments but will instead leave a few questions for reflection.

If the fact that God is love somehow implies that He does not punish, why has no saint, Church Father, or Pope in 2000 years come to this conclusion? Has no one used “theological reasoning” to the extent that it would be explicitly stated in any magisterial text that God does not punish? Why, on the contrary, can we find an abundance of the opposite assertion, to the extent that Alejandro criticizes me for citing excessively?

Even the Catholic Encyclopedia, one of the websites belonging to the ACI Group, of which Alejandro is the director, contradicts him clearly by stating exactly the opposite of what he claims:

“The second effect of sin lies in the infliction of the pain of suffering (reatus poenae). Sin (reatus culpae) is the cause of this obligation (reatus poenae). Suffering can be inflicted in this life through medicinal punishments, calamities, diseases, temporal evils, which tend to deter us from sin, or it can be inflicted in the life to come by God’s justice as vindictive punishment. The punishments in the future life are proportionate to the sin committed, and it is obligatory to endure this punishment for unrepented sins, which is what the ‘reatus poenae’ of theologians means.”1

Yes, on his own website, his own Catholic Encyclopedia says nothing different from, for instance, the Dogmatic Council of Trent, cited in previous chapters, where it is affirmed that God sends temporal punishments. To claim that the authors of the Catholic Encyclopedia, along with the Fathers of Trent, did not use “theological reasoning” is a stretch.

Objection 2: Punishment is evil, God is good, and God does not will evil

On this point, Alejandro delves into the mystery of evil, arguing that the fact that God punishes must be understood in light of this mystery. He begins with the principle that God is neither the author, agent, nor direct cause of evil, and in his view, this contradicts the idea that God punishes.

If we were to summarize this argument graphically again, it would be:

However, this is not a subject that theology and philosophy have neglected; they have studied it extensively without reaching conclusions anywhere near those of Alejandro. Before addressing the issue, we must distinguish between two types of evil: physical evil, such as pain, illness, and death, and moral evil, which is sin—essentially a negation of God.

Regarding moral evil, it must be said that since it is a negation of God, He cannot will it per se or per accidens—that is, neither as an end nor as a means. However, concerning physical evil, while God does not will it per se, meaning not out of affection for evil or as an end, He can will it per accidens, permitting it as a means to achieve a higher end, whether physical (such as the preservation of a higher life) or moral (such as punishment or moral purification).

Therefore, while God cannot be the direct cause of evil (since evil has no direct cause but rather an indirect one, being the absence of good2), He can will physical evil as a means to achieve a higher end. A comprehensive explanation of this is provided by Cardinal Zeferino Gonzalez in his work Filosofía Elemental (Elementary Philosophy)3.

To illustrate this, let us once again use the example of Zechariah’s punishment. We recall that when the angel Gabriel appeared to Zechariah to announce that his elderly wife would conceive John the Baptist, he doubted the angel’s words, and God punished him by striking him mute until the birth of his son (Luke 1:19-20). Let us now analyze this event from another perspective: Zechariah committed a fault and was punished with a physical affliction. Someone might rightly say, “This is an evil for Zechariah,” and that is true. But does this mean that God, by ordering his voice to be taken away, did something “evil”? No, God ultimately did him a good. By depriving him of his voice, God enacted an act of vindicative justice, helping Zechariah atone for his fault, and simultaneously an act of corrective justice, as this physical affliction served as a means for him to attain a greater good, leading him to repentance and spiritual growth.

Someone might object that this implies believing that God acted wrongly, to which we must respond: as the sovereign of the universe, God does not act wrongly when He disposes of the gifts He has freely given and is under no obligation to maintain.

Another issue with Alejandro’s argument is that it contradicts what he himself has been defending. He had acknowledged that in the Old Testament, God did punish and cited numerous examples. But under Alejandro’s reasoning, where punishment is considered evil, does that mean that in the Old Testament, God was the direct cause of evil? Alejandro will likely argue that God chose to reveal Himself in this way because the people were incapable of fully understanding Him. However, this does not satisfactorily explain how such actions could justify God acting against His own nature.

Footnotes

[1]

[2]

[3]

 

  1. Catholic Encyclopedia – Sin
  2. St. Thomas, Summa Theologica – Part I – Question 49
  3. This is how Cardinal Zeferino González explains it in his work Filosofía Elemental:

    Although God does not will physical evil per se or as an end—since He takes no delight in the suffering of His creatures as such, and far from abhorring them, He loves everything He created—it is undeniable that He can choose or will it as a proportionate means to achieve a good end. The reason is that, in this case, God’s willing of physical evil is directed toward and has as its end the good that presupposes the existence of physical evil as a means—or more properly speaking, as a hypothetical condition for the existence of the good willed by God. I say hypothetical because the existence and realization of certain goods, resulting from specific physical evils, is related to the degree of relative perfection that God chose to impart to this world, which could be superior in another possible world.

    As for moral evil, God neither wills it nor intends it, neither as a means nor as an end. This is because moral evil is repugnant to God’s infinite holiness, and it involves the subversion of the necessary order by which every creature, especially intelligent and free creatures, relates to God as the ultimate end of creation. Nevertheless, this does not prevent God from permitting its existence, as such permission does not imply approval. Furthermore, God has no obligation to prevent its existence. In fact, given the existence of intelligent and free beings, it could even be seen as fitting and natural for God to permit moral evil. This is because God, as the supreme and universal governor of the world, must allow each being to act according to the conditions of its nature. Human will is naturally fallible, capable of choosing between good and evil, and is free and responsible for its actions. Therefore, it is proper for God, as the universal providence of the world and of man, to provide the necessary means and assistance for moral good, but not to annihilate or constrain human freedom by imposing the physical necessity to do good.

    Additionally, the occurrence of moral evil serves:
    a) To manifest that when man does good, he does so freely and is therefore worthy of reward.
    b) To reveal God’s patience and forbearance.
    c) To demonstrate His mercy in forgiveness and His justice in punishment.

    From the foregoing, we can infer:

    1. Neither the existence of physical evil nor that of moral evil entails an absolute contradiction or repugnance to God’s providence and goodness.
    2. We can even identify plausible reasons and rational, just ends for their existence.
    3. God, in absolute terms, could prevent the existence of both physical and moral evil, either by creating another world or by arranging this world differently.
    4. Although we can identify some probable ends for God’s permission of moral evil, we remain ignorant of the ultimate cause of this permission. We do not know with certainty what God’s principal end and motives for permitting it are. Therefore, we must echo Scripture: “Who hath known the mind of the Lord? Or who hath been his counsellor?” (Romans 11:34). This reflection applies even more to our ignorance regarding the particular ends to which the existence of physical and moral evil in specific beings (A or B) is subordinated.

    The willing of physical evil, in the sense explained, does not contradict divine goodness. This is evident because, under the contrary hypothesis, God would not be able to will and bring about certain superior goods and perfections. Upon reflection, it becomes clear that the complete and absolute absence of physical evil would entail the absence of patience, fortitude, magnanimity, constancy, and, to sum up, the most beautiful and sublime aspects of virtue in all its various manifestations. Moreover, the absence of all physical evil would lead to the death or absolute stagnation of human society, with its arts, sciences, and industries, which are essentially humanity’s persistent struggle against physical evil.

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