We now arrive at the final chapter in this series dedicated to the subject of divine punishment. I imagine those who have followed along this far must be exhausted, though surely not more so than I am! I sincerely hope this exploration has helped deepen understanding of this significant issue, which, unfortunately, is sometimes misunderstood and even misrepresented in some Catholic parishes, including by priests. In this chapter, I will analyze the arguments presented in the last two programs by Alejandro Bermúdez, titled “Por qué Dios no castiga II” and “Por qué Dios no castiga III,” published in the same location as the previous installments.
Let’s begin…
Does Uncertainty about Divine Punishment Mean It Doesn’t Exist?
One of Alejandro’s primary arguments is that since no one can be certain that a particular misfortune is divine punishment, this implies that God never punishes.
To try to prove this, he draws an analogy between the relationship of a human father to his child and the relationship between God and us. He argues that when a human father punishes his child, he clearly explains why, so the child understands what behavior needs correction. Since we do not see God acting in this way, Alejandro concludes that God does not punish, as such punishment would require a clear explanation, as a father does with his child.
Problems with this Argument
We have already noted several New Testament examples showing that God can punish both with and without revealing the reasons. For example, when God strikes Zechariah mute until John the Baptist’s birth, the angel explains that the punishment is for his disbelief (Luke 1:18-19). Similarly, in the case of Ananias and Sapphira, St. Peter reveals that they have gravely sinned against the Holy Spirit (Acts 5:1-10). However, there are other instances where no reason is revealed, such as when Herod blasphemes and falls ill until he dies (Acts 12:21-23). We know this was a punishment because it is stated in the Gospel, but there is no evidence that this was revealed to Herod himself. Likewise, when early Christians became ill or died due to profaning the Eucharist, it is unclear that they recognized this punishment until St. Paul later warns them (1 Corinthians 11:29-30).
Here we come to a second flaw in this argument, as it relies on a false analogy. A false analogy is a type of fallacy where an analogical argument lacks a relevant similarity or overlooks differences that undermine the conclusion. In this case, while it is true that God acts toward us in an analogous way to a “father,” this does not mean that every characteristic of a human parental relationship can be applied to the relationship between God and humanity. For instance, a human father communicates directly with his children, speaks to them face-to-face, hugs them, and explains things clearly. God, however, does not communicate with us in this way; He acts through secondary causes. If we take Alejandro’s reasoning seriously, we would have to conclude not only that God does not punish in this life, but also that He does not correct, teach, love, or reward. Thus, we see how a false analogy can lead to absurd conclusions.
Therefore, the solution is not to conclude that God does not punish but to understand that the corrective function of punishment does not necessarily require that the person knows the punishment is for their sins. Suffering leads people to reflect and better connect with reality, causing them to realize the errors of their ways, even if only by reasoning from the consequences. To illustrate this point, and not because I consider biblical examples insufficient, I will recount an anecdote from the biography of Padre Pio of Pietrelcina, the stigmatized Catholic saint. It is said that a young woman from Benevento sought Padre Pio’s help for her husband, who had gone completely blind. Padre Pio told her that his blindness was a punishment from God for his salvation and purification, as he had committed the grave sin of beating his father when he was younger. The woman, in disbelief, relayed this to her husband, who initially denied it but ultimately confessed that he had indeed struck his father severely with an iron rod at age sixteen1.
Another point to consider is that punishment is primarily a reparation for the order of justice, and is not always or necessarily corrective, as seen in the case of eternal punishment. As St. Thomas Aquinas explains, punishment inherently involves justice, and the corrective or medicinal aspect is added in certain cases. In fact, it would be absurd for God to punish solely for a medicinal reason, without aiming to restore the order of justice when there has been sin.
A good explanation of this is provided by Fr. Antonio Royo Marín, a well-regarded theologian and author of numerous theological classics:
“Effect. Since the subjective cause of sin is a defective will, the penalty must affect that same will. Indeed, it is essential to punishment that it opposes the will; it has the effect of being contrary to the sinner’s will.
Guilt differs from punishment in that the former is voluntary and the latter against the will of the one who deserves it. All evils that fall upon the sinner as punishment for their guilt, even if they do not directly impact their will, affect them in terms of their will. This opposition or contrariety may be to the actual will, habitual will, or natural inclination of the will. Thus, it may happen that the sinner does not realize at a given moment that they are being punished for their sin, since the punishment may oppose not their current will but only their habitual or natural inclination. Nothing goes unpunished in the moral order disturbed by sin, even if the sinner is unaware of it.
Purpose. The act of sin makes a person deserving of punishment as it constitutes, as we have said, a violation of the order of divine justice, which can only be restored through reparation of the punishment, balancing the scales of divine justice disturbed by sin. For one who has taken undue pleasure or satisfaction, it is just, according to divine justice, that they suffer, whether willingly or not, some pain or penalty contrary to their will.
The essential purpose of punishment is therefore to compensate involuntarily for the voluntary contrariety with which the agent made themselves guilty before the ordering principle, rebelling against both it and the legitimate end it imposed. However, there are secondary or additional aims to punishment, such as restoring the order of justice violated by sin, healing the soul’s faculties—especially the will—which previous guilt disordered, and repairing the scandal caused to others by sin, etc.”2
Are Natural Disasters Punishments from God?
As his next argument, Alejandro attempts to show that the Magisterium supports his thesis, mentioning a recent debate where Monsignor Inos Biffi refuted the statements of Professor Roberto de Mattei, a well-known traditionalist intellectual who suggested that the earthquake in Japan might have been divine punishment for sin. Alejandro adds that Biffi responded at the Holy See’s request, publishing an article in prominent Catholic journals closely associated with the Vatican, such as Civiltà Cattolica and L’Osservatore Romano.
Problems with this Argument
The first error in this argument is overlooking the fact that an article published in a Catholic journal, however reputable, does not constitute the Magisterium. Does the Holy See perhaps review the content of these journals? Probably, but that does not make it Magisterial teaching. Presenting an article in a Catholic journal as the official stance of the Magisterium misleads the audience, who may end up mistaking it for doctrine.
Another flaw is that Alejandro similarly takes out of context the Catechism of the Catholic Church and other Magisterial documents (Dives in Misericordia, Reconciliatio et Paenitentia, etc.). To understand why, we need to examine the debate’s context.
When a natural disaster as severe as the Japanese earthquake occurs, causing thousands or even millions of deaths, the question is not primarily whether God can punish but whether God might send a punishment affecting both the innocent and the guilty. In this specific case, a young girl wrote to Pope Benedict XVI, asking if the death of her parents was a divine punishment. A claim like that attributed to Professor Roberto de Mattei would deeply wound the sentiments of this child and many others without justified cause, making it a reckless statement. As we have explained in previous chapters, absent a special revelation, we cannot be certain that a particular misfortune is a divine punishment.
To clarify what I mean by “reckless,” let us consider the well-known case of Brazilian presidential candidate Tancredo Neves in the 1985 elections. Before the election, he claimed that if he received 500,000 more votes, not even God could keep him from the presidency. Though he won, he fell ill the day before the inauguration and later died. Many said God had punished him for his blasphemy. Even though this might seem similar to the case of Herod, who fell ill after blaspheming, we lack special revelation to be certain. Therefore, it would be reckless to make such a claim, and prudence requires us to wait until the afterlife to learn the truth.
Now, without asserting certainty about any particular case, can God punish through a catastrophe that affects innocent people? The answer is irrelevant to this analysis, as even a negative answer would not imply that God could not send punishments that only affect the guilty. This is an entirely separate debate.
What we can say with certainty is that, while the sins of some may impact others, no one suffers spiritual harm due to another’s sin. St. Thomas Aquinas explains it well:
“Punishment can be considered in two ways. First, as retribution, and in this sense, only sin deserves it, because punishment restores the balance of justice, whereby one who, by sinning, has exceeded in following their own will suffers some harm against that will. Therefore, since all sin is voluntary, even original sin, as stated (1-2 q.81 a.1), it follows that no one is punished in this way except for voluntary sin.
From another angle, punishment can be seen as medicinal, serving not only to heal from past sin but also to prevent future sin and to encourage the sinner to do good. In this sense, one may sometimes be punished without guilt, though never without cause. However, it must be understood that medicinal punishment never deprives a person of a greater good to procure a lesser one—for example, taking away someone’s sight to heal their heel—but sometimes causes minor harm to offer help in a more important matter. Since spiritual goods are of greater value and temporal goods of lesser, a person may sometimes be punished in the latter without guilt, such as by enduring many hardships in this present life that God inflicts to serve as humility or a test. Conversely, no one is punished in spiritual goods without personal guilt, neither in this life nor in the next, as in the life to come punishments are not medicinal but rather a consequence of spiritual condemnation.”3
Is Salvifici Doloris Out of Context?
Alejandro has also claimed that I took Pope John Paul II’s words out of context in his Apostolic Letter Salvifici Doloris. However, the text was actually cited by my friend Adrian Ferreira, who has also participated in this debate. I referenced other instances where Pope John Paul II affirmed that God indeed punishes (see, for example, the audience of July 25, 2001, titled “God Punishes and Saves”). Nonetheless, it is worth clarifying that the citation is not out of context. Let us read a few excerpts from Salvifici Doloris:
“Corresponding to the moral evil of sin is punishment, which guarantees the moral order in the same transcendent sense in which this order is laid down by the will of the Creator and Supreme Lawgiver. From this there also derives one of the fundamental truths of religious faith, equally based upon Revelation, namely that God is a just judge, who rewards good and punishes evil: “For thou art just in all that thou hast done to us, and all thy works are true and thy ways right, and all thy judgments are truth. Thou hast executed true judgments in all that thou hast brought upon us… for in truth and justice thou hast brought all this upon us because of our sins”.
“Already in the Old Testament we note an orientation that begins to go beyond the concept according to which suffering has a meaning only as a punishment for sin, insofar as it emphasizes at the same time the educational value of suffering as a punishment. Thus in the sufferings inflicted by God upon the Chosen People there is included an invitation of his mercy, which corrects in order to lead to conversion: ‘… these punishments were designed not to destroy but to discipline our people.”
“The Book of Job does not violate the foundations of the transcendent moral order, based upon justice, as they are set forth by the whole of Revelation, in both the Old and the New Covenants. At the same time, however, this Book shows with all firmness that the principles of this order cannot be applied in an exclusive and superficial way. While it is true that suffering has a meaning as punishment, when it is connected with a fault, it is not true that all suffering is a consequence of a fault and has the nature of a punishment. The figure of the just man Job is a special proof of this in the Old Testament. Revelation, which is the word of God himself, with complete frankness presents the problem of the suffering of an innocent man: suffering without guilt. Job has not been punished, there was no reason for inflicting a punishment on him, even if he has been subjected to a grievous trial. From the introduction of the Book it is apparent that God permitted this testing as a result of Satan’s provocation.”
This document requires little commentary, as it is quite clear, so I will only make a couple of points.
First, note that it states: “The Book of Job does not violate the foundations of the transcendent moral order, based upon justice, as they are set forth by the whole of Revelation, in both the Old and the New Covenants.” I highlight this point to prevent the claim that, because the Book of Job belongs to the Old Testament, the Pope’s teaching is not valid for us. Remember that he is discussing the transcendent moral order, which includes both the Old and New Covenants.
Now we turn to the key part of the text, which states, “While it is true that suffering has a meaning as punishment, when it is connected with a fault, it is not true that all suffering is a consequence of a fault and has the nature of a punishment.” This aligns with what we have stated: not all suffering is punishment, but it is so when connected to guilt.
Does the Parable of the Prodigal Son Show That God Does Not Punish?
Another recurring argument in Alejandro’s podcasts is his interpretation of the parable of the prodigal son, where the father showed compassion and did not punish his son after he had squandered his inheritance. Alejandro reasons that since the father did not punish, God, as a good father, also would not punish.
However, when we say that God can punish if He wills, we do not deny that, as the sovereign of the universe, He has the right to be merciful. Nor do we claim that He is obliged to apply merely commutative justice. If we generalize from a parable meant to highlight mercy, we might end up believing, along with Protestants, that Purgatory does not exist simply because Jesus was merciful to the good thief and promised him paradise that very day. Let us not forget that Jesus, in other passages where personal responsibility is the focus, warns of the punishment awaiting those who do not act accordingly: “And that servant, who knew the will of his lord, and prepared not himself, and did not according to his will, shall be beaten with many stripes. But he that knew not, and did things worthy of stripes, shall be beaten with few stripes. And unto whomsoever much is given, of him much shall be required: and to whom they have committed much, of him they will demand the more.” (Luke 12:47-48).
Conclusions
With this, we come to the end, and I believe I have addressed all the arguments presented by Alejandro Bermúdez in his audio series (a total of seven programs). I would like to extend special thanks to Father José María Iraburu, Luis Fernando Pérez, director of Infocatólica, and Néstor Martínez, who have guided me in this topic. I am also grateful to those whose comments enriched this work and significantly improved the final result, as well as to those who have patiently read each installment. I will add an additional chapter after the publication of the digital book that Alejandro has promised, if it includes any further arguments worth analyzing.
May God bless you all.
- Carty, Charles Mortimer Fr., El Padre Pio: El Estigmatizado, 2nd ed., Ed. Poblet, Buenos Aires (Argentina), 1960.
A digital PDF copy of this book is available at AutoresCatólicos: http://www.autorescatolicos.org/misc12/reinadelcielopadrepio.pdf. - Translated from Dios y su obra, Antonio Royo Marín, Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos, p. 610.
- St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, L.2, Q.108, a.4
